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HILMER DOCTRINE AND PATENT SYSTEM
HARMONIZATION: WHAT DOES A FOREIGN INVENTOR
HAVE AT STAKE?
INTRODUCTION
Strong intellectual property rights throughout the world are becoming
increasingly important to the economic health of the United States.' Countries
with weak intellectual property systems threaten to frustrate the technological
development and competitiveness of the United States and to jeopardize future
productivity of the United States in a world economy. 2 Multilateral intellectual
property agreements are one of the avenues pursued by the federal government to
protect United States interests. 3 The draft treaty for harmonization negotiated
through the World Intellectual Property Organization 4 (WIPO) is an example of a
potential multilateral agreement.5
Anticipation of a multilateral agreement 6 prompted the introduction of the
Patent Harmonization Act of 1992 into the House of Representatives 7 and
Senate.8 Proposed changes include conversion to a first to file system with prior
user rights, publishing patent applications within 18 months of filing, and
I Harvey J. Winter, The Role of the United States Government in Improving International Intellectual Property
Protection, 2 J.L. & TEcH. 325, 325 (1987). A study by the International Trade Commission estimated U.S.
industry lost between six and eight billion dollars in sales during 1982 due to "counterfeiting, 'passing off,' and
copyright and patent infringement" by foreign competitors. Id.
2 See Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The Need for Improved Patent
Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307 (1987). Research-based pharmaceutical companies are an example
of an industry that is particularly victimized by unfair competition from foreign competitors. Id. at 307-08.
Pharmaceutical companies spent $4.1 billion on research in 1985. Id at 308. In 1987, average cost to develop a
new drug was about $125 million and the average period to develop and obtain marketing approval was about
ten years. lId The cost has very likely increased substantially since 1987. These companies can justify these
huge expenditures in time and money only if they are assured of having a period of time to exclusively market a
new product.ld. A strong patent system assures this period of timeJd.
Pharmaceutical companies in countries with weak patent systems are able to imitate and market new drugs
without the huge expenditures associated with developing that drug. Id. at 308-09. A study of five countries
having weak patent systems revealed sales of new drugs by companies in these countries of $192 million in
comparison to U.S. company sales of only $162 million, lId at 309.
3 Winter, supra note 1, at 326.
4 A specialized agency of the United Nations. Id. at 327.
5 Edward G. Fiorito, The WIPO "Basic Proposal" for Harmonization of Patent Laws Viewed from the U.S.
Practitioner's Point of View, 19 AM. INTEL. PROP. L. Ass'N. L.Q. 24,30 (1991). Fiorito presents and discusses
Articles I through 24 of the WIPO draft treaty, current as of November 1990. Id.
6 138 CONG. REc. E1041 (daily ed. April 10, 1992) (bill introduction speech by Rep. Hughes). "The Patent
System Harmonization Act of 1992 anticipates the likely components of a harmonization treaty and reflects the
ensuing changes that might be called for in our patent laws. These include a conversion to a first to file system;
the recognition of prior user rights; the publication of patent applications 18 months after they are filed; and a
change in the term of patents. These provisions will each be considered by the subcommittee." Id.
7 H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced on April 9, 1992, by Representative William H.
Hughes).
8 S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (introduced on April 9, 1992, by Senator Dennis DeConcini).
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changing the term of patent protection to 20 years from the date of filing.9
Congress must decide whether the proposed changes will benefit the American
people.'0 As evidenced by the Report of the Advisory Commission on Patent
Law Reform, much consideration has been given to the interests and concerns of
United States inventors.1 In contrast, this comment focuses on an aspect of
United States patent law that discriminates against foreign applicants and should
be of active interest to foreign governments seeking harmonization.
Under current United States law, an applicant is entitled to a patent unless
barred by one of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 10212 assuming other procedural
and substantive requirements are met.13 This section of the patent statutes is
generally regarded as being the sole source of "prior art."14 Under 35 U.S.C. §
103, an applicant may not obtain a patent even if an invention is "not identically
disclosed or described" in the prior art of § 102 if the variations over the prior art
9 Senator William Hughes' speech, supra note 6.
10 Id. "Congress must consider whether a harmonization treaty, including both the changes to U.S. laws, and
the changes in the laws that would be made by our sister countries, would overall benefit the American People.
The bill that we are introducing today provides Congress with the opportunity to consider these changes in the
event that treaty is worked out. We would not, at this time, consider making these changes absent the
concessions that the Unites States is seeking in laws of other nations that are necessary to assure adequate and
effective protection of intellectual property." Id.
11 THE ADVISORY COMMISION ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
(August 1992). "The issues studied by the Advisory Commission range from key harmonization questions to
methods for reducing the cost and complexity associated with modem patent litigation. For each issue, the
Commission sought and received extensive public input, through the use of open meetings, invitations for
public comment, and informal discussions with bar and industry groups and private individuals. Thus, the
Advisory Commission, during its tenure, held four public meetings, sought public input on proposed topics, and
sought to incorporate suggestions from the public into its recommendations for reform. The public input has
been essential in not only identifying what problem areas exist, but in deciding which course of action will be
most appropriate for the United States as a whole to pursue. This public input, along with the expertise and
experience of the members of the Commission, has enabled the Commission to consider, assess and endorse a
series of recommendations for reform that will ensure that the U.S. patent system continues to promote
technological and economic growth." Id at 5.
12 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). "A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed
publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the application for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in
public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applicant for patent in the
United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of an inventor's
certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the
application for patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve
months before the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent by another filed in the
United States before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent... or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this country by another who had
not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not
only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable
diligence of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other." Id.
13 For example, the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) and 35 U.S.C. § 111 (1988).
1 4
DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.03[3](g) (1989).
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would be obvious to "a person of ordinary skill in the art" at the time of the
invention. t5
A foreign applicant has the additional burden of complying with the
requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 10416 which prevents a foreign applicant from
proving a date of invention by evidence of activities in a foreign country except
by the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 119.17 Under 35 U.S.C. § 11918, a foreign
application filed in a country granting similar rights to United States inventors
"shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this
country" on the foreign filing date. 19
The discrimination against foreign inventors arises under a doctrine of
judicial interpretation of these statutes established by two Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals decisions.20 The first, decided in 1966, (hereinafter referred to as
Hilmer I) held that 35 U.S.C. § 119 grants a foreign applicant only a personal
right against the patent defeating events of 35 U.S.C. § 102.21 A prior foreign
filing date established under 35 U.S.C. § 119 does not establish a United States
Patent as prior art against other applicants under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or (e). 22
The second, decided in 1970, (hereinafter referred to as Hilmer II) extended that
holding to 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 23 This doctrine forces the Patent and Trademark
Office to grant multiple valid patents that are not patentably distinct. 24
The following discussion begins with a historical analysis that outlines the
boundaries and illustrates the basis of Hilmer doctrine. Examples of the effects
of Hilmer doctrine are presented as part of that discussion. Next, effects of the
15 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). "A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner
in which the invention was made." IL
16 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
17 "In proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office and in the courts, an applicant for a patent, or a
patentee, may not establish a date of invention by reference to knowledge or use thereof, or other activity with
respect thereto, in a foreign country, except as provided in section 119 and 365 of this title." kd Section 365
relates to priority of a national application and is not of concern here. 35 U.S.C. § 365 (1988).
18 35 U.S.C. § 119 (1988).
19 "An application for patent for an invention filed in this country by any person who has, or whose legal
representatives or assigns have, previously regularly filed an application for a patent for the same invention in a
foreign country which affords similar privileges in the case of applications filed in the United States or to
citizens of the United States, shall have the same effect as the same application would have if filed in this
country on the date on which the application for patent for the same invention was first filed in such foreign
country, if the application in this country is filed within twelve months from the earliest date on which such
foreign application was filed..L." Id
20 In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966) and In re Hilmer, 424 F.2d 1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
21 In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 882-83 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
22 id
23 424 F.2d 1108, 1113-14 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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application of Hilmer doctrine after an interference are discussed followed by an
analysis of the Patent Harmonization Act of 1992.
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
Decisions Leading Up to Hilmer I
In the 1926 decision of Milburn v. Davis-Bournonville, the Supreme Court of
the United States held that a United States patent application becomes available
for use as a prior art reference on its United States filing date.25 Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the Court.26 The suit involved infringement of a patent
granted to Whitford for an improvement in welding and cutting apparatus. 27 The
defendant claimed that Whitford's patent was invalid because Whitford was not
the first inventor as evidenced by a patent granted to Clifford.28 Whitford filed a
U.S. patent application on March 4, 1911, which issued as a patent on June 4,
1912.29 Clifford filed an application on January 31, 1911 which issued as a
patent on February 6, 1912.30 Clifford's application completely disclosed
Whitford's invention but did not claim it.31 The district court held that Clifford
was not a prior inventor because he did not claim the invention even though it
was disclosed in his application and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 32 The
Supreme Court reversed. 33
Justice Holmes began his analysis by noting that under R.S. 488634 an
applicant could receive a patent for an invention "not known or used by others in
this country, before his invention." 35 A statutory defense to infringement under
R.S. 492036 was that the patentee "was not the original and first inventor or
discoverer of any material and substantial part of the thing patented." 37 Literally
interpreted, these words meant that a person was not the first inventor if another
person "made a complete and adequate description of the thing claimed before
25 270 U.S. 390 (1926).







33 ld at 402.
34 Similar provisions now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Harold S. Meyer, Are Patents Effective References as of
Foreign Filing Dates?, 47 J. PAT. OFF. SOCY 391, 393 (1965).
35 270 U.S. at 399.
36 Similar provisions now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988). Under 35 U.S.C. § 282, a defense against a claim of
infringement includes "[i]nvaidity of the patent or any claim in suit on any ground specified in Part II of this
title as a condition for patentability." 35 U.S.C. § 282(2) (1988). Part I1 includes 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (1988).
37 270 U.S. at 399-400.
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the earliest moment to which the alleged inventor can carry his invention back." 38
However, Justice Holmes noted that this principle did not apply if the other
person recorded the invention but then kept it secret and did not communicate it
to anyone 9 Likewise, abandoned patent applications could not be used as prior
art, and a foreign patent application could not serve as prior art if it had not been
patented or described in a printed publication.
40
Justice Holmes went on to observe that a publication in a periodical barred
the grant of a patent because the invention became public property.41 Clifford
had taken all possible steps to publish his invention by filing a patent
application. 42 The entire disclosure would be published as soon as the Patent
Office completed its work.43 Justice Holmes concluded that Clifford should not
be penalized by the necessity of delay in the Patent Office.44 Clifford's patent
clearly showed that Whitford was not the first inventor.45 "It is not necessary to
show who did invent the thing in order to show that Whitford did not."46 Justice
Holmes concluded by noting that this decision did not apply to foreign
inventions. 47
In the 1935 decision of Viviani v. Taylor, the Commissioner of Patents held
that an earlier foreign priority date of a reference United States patent was
irrelevant when "determining whether claims in an application should be rejected
in view of the unclaimed disclosure" of the reference patent.48 The Patent and
Trademark Office had declared an interference between three applicants: Viviani,
Taylor, and Herzog.49 In Viviani, the court reviewed the decision of a primary
examiner that denied Taylor's motion to dissolve the interference with the
opposing party Herzog.50 Taylor claimed that Herzog could not patent the counts
because he did not claim a date of invention earlier than the British filing date of
a reference United States patent granted to Briggs, who was not a party in the
interference.5' The petitioner noted that R.S. 488752 "provides that an application




4 2 1d at 401.
43 1&
4 4 1 d
4 5 Id
46 u
47 ld. at 402.
48 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 448,449 (Comm'r. Pat. 1935).
4 9 1d. at 448.
50i..
51 Id. Taylor's basis for arguing that Herzog could not patent the counts over Brigg's disclosure is not presented
in the opinion.




Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
AKRON LAW REVIEW
filed in this country by a person who regularly filed an application for the same
invention in a foreign country which affords similar privileges to citizens of this
country shall have the same force and effect as if the application had been filed in
this country on the same date."5 3 Also, the effect of Milburn established Briggs
as prior art on his U.S. filing date. Petitioner then argued that R.S. 488 7 5 in
combination with Milburn established Briggs as prior art on his British filing
date. 55 Under R.S. 488756, the British filing had "the same force and effect as if
the application had been filed in this country on the same date."57
Commissioner Coe rejected this argument on three grounds.5" First, R.S.
488759 was intended only to allow a foreign applicant to establish a right of
priority in compliance with the International Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property. 60 The Commissioner stated:
The Convention provides that any person who has regularly filed an
application for patent in one of the countries adherent to the
Convention shall have a period of priority within which he may file
applications in the other member countries without loss of any right by
reason of anything that happened between the two filing dates... This
statute has no bearing upon the right of another party to a patent
except in the case of an interference where the two parties are
claiming the same invention [emphasis added].61
Second, Commissioner Coe stated that Milburn held only that a U.S. patent
established evidence of invention in this country as of the United States
application filing date.62 A foreign filing date was merely evidence of invention
in a foreign country.63
Finally, the Commissioner noted that R.S. 492364 established that an
invention was still patentable "on account of the invention or discovery, or any
part thereof, having been known or used in a foreign country, before his
invention or discovery thereof, if it had not been patented or described in a
53 72 U.S.P.Q. (B NA) at 448.
5 4 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
5' 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 448.
56 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
57 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 448.
58 Id. at 449-50.
59\ Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.




64Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
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printed publication. '" 65 Combining the "in this country" 66 language of R.S. 488767
with Milburn would permit a foreign inventor to defeat another applicant's right
to a United States patent based on the foreign inventor's earlier foreign filing
date, "which at most is evidence of knowledge of the invention abroad."68 This
would directly contravene the explicitly stated policy of R.S. 492369 which
permitted an applicant to receive a United States patent in spite of knowledge
abroad. 70
Four years later, in Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that a foreign inventor could use evidence of
activity in a foreign country to establish priority of invention. 71 Shimadzu was a
citizen and resident of Japan72 who applied for and obtained three United States
patents.73 The first patent application was filed on January 30, 1922, and claimed
a method for making finely divided lead powder for electric batteries.74 The
second application was filed on July 14, 1923, and claimed a method for making
a fine powder of lead suboxide and metallic lead and the product of the process.75
The third application was filed on April 27, 1926, and claimed an apparatus for
making lead oxide powder.76
In early 1921, the Electric Storage Battery Company (Electric Storage)
started using a machine in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, which involved both the
method and apparatus claims of Shimadzu's patents. 77 Electric Storage did not
have knowledge of Shimadzu's inventions. 78 Shimadzu subsequently filed suit
for infringement of all three patents. 79
The district court held for Shimadzu and the court of appeals affirmed.80
Electric Storage sought review of three issues in the Supreme Court.8' First,
whether a foreign inventor could enjoin a domestic business from using a
65 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 449.
6 6 Id. at 448.
67 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
6872 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 449. Provisions similar to R.S. 4923 now in 35 U.S.C. 102(a). Meyer, supra note 32,
at 393.
69 Similar provisions now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 32, at 393.
70 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 449.
71 307 U.S. 5, 15 (1939).
721d. at7.




7 7 1d. at9.
7 8 Id.
79 Id. at 7-8
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patented apparatus or process by proving an actual date of invention with
evidence of acts in a foreign country, when the challenged use began before the
foreign inventor's United States filing date.8- Second, whether Shimadzu had
abandoned his inventions.83 Third, whether any of the three patents were invalid
because Electric Storage had used any of the patented processes or apparatus for
more than two years prior to Shimadzu's United States filing date.84
In arguing the first issue, Electric Storage asserted that R.S. 4886,85 4887,86
and 492387 restricted a foreign inventor to the actual United States filing date in
establishing priority of invention unless the inventor communicated the invention
to a person in this country, or if the invention had been patented abroad.
88
Justice Roberts began by analyzing the language and history of R.S. 488689
as of the time the patents were granted. 90 He concluded that nothing in the
language of R.S. 488691 restricted the place of discovery or invention to this
country.92 Nothing in R.S. 488793 was applicable because that statute established
only priority rights for a foreign inventor and was not applicable to the facts at
hand. 94
Justice Roberts agreed with Electric Storage that this statutory interpretation
resulted in an anomalous situation.9 5 A domestic inventor that filed a United
States application was protected by R.S. 492396 from a prior foreign invention,
even if the foreign inventor had filed a foreign patent application. 97 On the other
hand, a domestic inventor that dedicated an invention to the public could be later
enjoined by a foreign inventor that had received a United States patent, if the




85 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
86 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
87 Similar provisions now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
88 307 U.S. at 9-10.
89 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
90307 U.S. at 7-12.
91 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
92 307 U.S. at 12.
93 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
94 307 U.S. at 12. "[The section does not contain any provision which precludes proof of facts respecting the
actual date of invention in a foreign country to overcome the prior knowledge or use bar of § 4886." Id.
95 Id. at 13-14.
96 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
97307 U.S. at 13.
[Vol. 26: 2
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prior to the two year statutory bar.98 Justice Roberts concluded that Congress had
the responsibility to correct the inconsistency.99
On the second issue, Justice Roberts held that Shimadzu had not abandoned
the invention merely because he had not claimed the subject matter of the United
States applications in certain Japanese applications. °0 Concerning the last issue,
Justice Roberts held that of the three patents, only the earliest filed patent was
valid.10' "A mere experimental use is not the public use defined by the Act, but a
single use for profit, not purposely hidden, is such. The ordinary use of a
machine or the practise [sic] of a process in a factory in the usual course of
producing articles for commercial purposes is public use." 102
Electric Storage had used the patented process and apparatus without
concealment in the United States for more than two years prior to the United
States filing dates of Shimadzu's two later patents.103 Electric Storage had used
the process and apparatus of Shimadzu's earliest filed patent for only six months
prior to the United States filing date. 1°4 Justice Roberts remanded the case for a
determination of whether Shimadzu's earliest patent was valid and infringed.
105
In 1946, Congress passed the Boykin Act which legislatively overruled the
Shimadzu decision.10 6 This statute, now 35 U.S.C. § 104,107 allows a foreign
inventor to show evidence of invention in a foreign country only by proof of
filing of a foreign patent application and only if the United States application was
filed within 12 months after the foreign filing.108 R.S. 4887 eventually became
recodified as 35 U.S.C. § 119.109 Further, the enactment of 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)
codified the Milburn holding by the Patent Reform Act of 1952.110 Two other
statutes, R.S. 4886 ("not known or used by others in this country") and R.S. 4923
("shall not be held to be void on account of the invention or discovery thereof,




100 Id at 15-17.




105 d at 21-22.
1 0 6 David S. Fishman, An Analysis of the Combined Effect of 35 USC § 119 and 35 USC § 102(e), 46 J. PAT.
OFF. SocY 181, 187 (1964).
1 0 7 1d
108 35 U.S.C. § 104 (1988), see supra note 16 and accompanying text.
109 Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
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The rule stated in Viviani stood unchallenged for many years.11 2 After
Viviani, the Patent Office enacted section 715.01 of the Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure:
In overcoming, under rule 131, a domestic patent where the patentee
has an earlier foreign filing date to which he would be entitled in
establishing priority to the invention claimed in the patent, it is not
necessary for the applicant to carry his date back of the patentee's
foreign filing date.' 13
A patent granted to a foreign inventor could be used as prior art against other
applications under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) (previously Milburn) as of the United
States filing date. An earlier foreign filing only granted the inventor a right of
priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 (previously R.S. 4887). The later enactment of 35
U.S.C. 104 permitted a foreign inventor to use only a foreign filing date as
evidence of prior invention in a foreign country (the Boykin Act).
The Dispute Begins
In 1963, an article written by Leon Chasan and Frederick H. Rabin suggested
that the relationship between 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) and 35 U.S.C. § 119 as
established by Viviani was questionable. 1 4 Chasan and Rabin began their
analysis by noting that the European economy was increasing in strength and that
development of foreign technology was accelerating.1 15 "[F]oreign inventors will
thus rely on 35 U.S.C. § 119 so as to acquire the benefit of their earlier filing date
abroad rather than have applications subject to the later U. S. filing date. The
problem of dates for anticipatory purposes is, therefore, one of increasing
importance."1 16
The article continued with several examples of potential scenarios that run
counter to normal principals of United States patent law. 117 The examples
demonstrate how the Viviani reasoning allows a later applicant to swear behind
the United States filing date of a reference patent earlier submitted by a foreign
applicant.1 8 The foreign applicant preserves his right to a patent via 35 U.S.C. §
119. The two patents that issue are not patentably distinct. 19
11 2 In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 865 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
1131Id at 881.
114 Leon Chasan and Frederick H. Rabin, Effective Filing Dates of U.S. Patents Based on 35 U.S.C. Sec. 119,
45 J. PAT. OFF. Soc Y 601,602-04 (1963).
115 Id. at 602.
161d1
117 Id. at 603-04.
118 Id. "The effect of this position of the patent Office can be exemplified by reference to some hypothetical
cases. Assume that a patent has issued based on a foreign application with a convention date of January 1,
1960, and a U. S. filing date of January 1, 1961. A second inventor later applying for a patent on matter
[Vol. 26: 2
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Chasan and Rabin first addressed whether a United States patent could be
used as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) on an earlier foreign filing date.120
Their analysis was based on several decisions which suggested that the foreign
filing priority date determined when a United States patent became available for
use as prior art. 12' Next, the authors addressed whether a United States patent
established as prior art on a foreign filing date under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) could be
extended to 35 U.S.C. § 103 as evidence of obviousness. 22 The authors cited
further decisions which supported the proposition that § 102(e) references could
be used as evidence of obviousness under § 103.123 Based on this analysis,
Chasan and Rabin concluded that sufficient authority existed to support the
proposition that a foreign priority date should control for determining whether a
patent can be used as a prior art reference under both §§ 102(e) and 103.124
An article by David S. Fishman next appeared in 1964 that mounted a
stronger attack on the Patent Office's position. 25 His article began with a
hypothetical fact situation similar to the hypotheticals proposed by Chasan and
Raban. t26 Fishman's analysis started with a review of Milburn. 127 He noted that
disclosed but not claimed in the foreign application would merely have to establish completion of his invention
in a Rule 131 Affidavit prior to January 1, 1961, the later of the two dates; this rule, therefore, can in many
instances, be quite beneficial to the second inventor. Additionally, as often happens in the case of important
inventions, knowledge of the subject matter contained in the original (foreign) patent application of a foreign
applicant becomes available sometime between the convention date abroad and the filing date in this country.
In this intervening period, many patent applications can be filed - based on this earlier knowledge - which do
not represent any patentable improvement thereover [emphasis added]. Since the Patent Office, however,
examines cases only on an ex parte basis and has no knowledge of whether the later applicant knew of the
earlier invention and does not use the [foreign priority date] for anticipatory purposes, these later cases are often
allowed.
Additionally, the original foreign inventor's assignee can file in the U.S. on a large number of
minuscule, normally unpatentable variations, over his basic idea [emphasis added]. Where additional cases are
filed in the home country between the earliest convention date and the U.S. filing date, the original convention
date cannot be cited and, therefore, numerous additional patents can be obtained as long as double patenting is
avoided. This is not true in the case of domestic inventors, where the first case becomes a reference as of its
earliest filing date to measure inventiveness against the subsequent ones." Id.
120/Id. at 606.
121 Id. at 606-10. Oelbaum v. Lovable Co., 211 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), affd, 322 F.2d 1022 (2d Cir.
1963); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 193 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd in part and rev'd in
part, 307 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1962); Ellis-Foster Co. v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 198 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1952);
Van Der Horst Corp. v. Chromium Corp., 197 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1952); Young v. General Electric Co., 96 F.
Supp. 109 (N.D. I11. 1951); Permo, Inc. v. Hudson-Ross, Inc., 179 F.2d 386 (7th Cir,. 1950); Alexander Milburn
Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926); Federal Yeast Corp. v. Fleischman Co., 13 F.2d 570 (4th
Cir. 1926).
122 Chasan and Rabin, supra note 114, at 610.
123 Id. at 610-12. Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 313 U.S. 259 (1941); Alexander
Milburn Co. v. Davis-Bournonville Co., 270 U.S. 390 (1926); Kendall Co. v. Tetley Tea Co., 189 F.2d 558 (1st
Cir. 1951); Western States Machine Co. v. S. S. Hepworth Co., 147 F.2d 345 (2d Ci. 1945) cert. denied, 325
U.S. 873 (1945).
124 Chasan and Rabin, supra note 114, at 612.
125 Fishman, supra note 106.
126 Id. at 182-83. "A filed an application for a patent in Germany on January 1, 1960, and A also filed a similar
application in the United States on July 1, 1960, claiming the benefit of the German filing date under the
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35 U.S.C. § 119 stated that a foreign application should have "the same effect it
would have had if it had been filed in this country." 128 Combining the Milbum
decision and 35 U.S.C. § 119 meant that a United States patent issued to a
foreign inventor claiming an earlier foreign priority date became prior art under §
102(e) on the foreign priority date rather than the United States filing date. 29 He
dismissed Justice Holmes' statement in Milburn that the situation would be
different if a foreign invention was involved as being cryptic.130
Fishman continued with a discussion of the Shimadzu decision.131 He
concluded that Shimadzu represented the proposition that a court may not add
words to a statute by "judicial or quasi judicial modification."'132 He then
concluded that the "in this country" language of 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 102(e) was
so clear that the two sections must be read together. 33 To read the sections
otherwise would be equivalent to adding words to a statute which was prohibited
by Shimadzu 34
Fishman continued by analyzing several cases and, based on his
interpretations, was able to find sufficient authority to support his position. 35
Concerning Viviani, he came to the conclusion that Commissioner Coe had read
additional words into R.S. 4887136 by limiting it to a personal right to be used by
a foreign inventor to protect a right to a patent. 37 However, no such limitation
was expressly stated in the statute and, under Fishman's interpretation of
Shimadzu, the Supreme Court disapproved of adding words to a statute. ' 38
B filed a patent application in the United States on June 1, 1960, and B cannot establish a date of
conception earlier than his filing date. Assume B's application is still pending; however, the issue would be the
same even if B's application had matured into a patent ... A's patent will be available as a reference against B
if the date of A's German application is considered to be the effective date of A's United States application, but
A's patent will not be a reference against B if the effective date of A's United States application is limited to the
actual filing date in the United States." Id
127 lId at 183.
128 1,d at 185.
1291d
130Id
131 Id at 186-87.
132 Id at 187.
133 Id at 188.
134 id
135 Id. at 188-207/. James B. Clow & Sons, Inc. v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 313 F.2d 46 (5th Cir.
1963); Wickman v. Vinco Corp., 288 F.2d 310 (6th Cir. 1961); Bergstrom and Trobeck v. Tomlinson and
Tomlinson, 220 F.2d 766 (C.C.P.A. 1955); Ex parte Blumiein 103 U.S.P.Q. 223 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952 &
1953), affd sub. nonm, In re Walker, 213 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1954); Ellis-Foster v. Reichhold Chemicals, Inc.,
198 F.2d 42 (3rd Cir. 1952); Federal Yeast Corp. v. Fleischmann Co., 13 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1926); Kling v.
Haring, 11 F.2d 202 (D.C. Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271 U.S. 671 (1926); Sperry Rand Corp. v. Knapp-Monarch
Co., 193 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Pa. 1960), affd in part and rev'd in part, 307 F.2d 344 (3d Cir. 1962); Young v.
General Electric Co., 96 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. II. 1951); Midwest Mfg. Co. v. Staynew Filter Corp., 11 F. Supp.
705 (W.D. N.Y. 1935).
136 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 119. Meyer, supra note 34, at 393.
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The Patent Office Fans the Flames
In 1964, the Patent Office Board of Appeals decided Ex Parte Zemla which
implicitly overruled Viviani. 139 In that case, Zemla and Egger filed an application
for a patent on an electric wrist watch in the United States on April 15, 1959,140
and claimed an earlier foreign priority filing date April 16, 1958.141 The
examiner rejected claims 59 through 66 as not being patentable over a United
States patent issued to Gisiger-Stahli.142 Gisiger-Stahli filed in the United States
on June 16, 1958, and claimed earlier foreign priority filing dates of July 2, 1957,
and February 28, 1958.143
Essentially, the board adopted the reasoning of the Fishman article. 44 The
language of 35 U.S.C. § 119, literally interpreted, stated that a foreign priority
filing "'shall have the same effect' as it would have if filed in the United States on
the date on which the application was filed in the foreign country. This language
is plain; it gives the application the status of an application filed in the United
States on a particular date."'145 Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e), an applicant is not
entitled to a patent if "the invention was described in a patent granted on an
application for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention
thereof by the applicant."' 46 Therefore, a United States patent granted to a
foreign inventor became available for use as a prior art reference under § 102(e)
on the foreign priority date. 147 Zemla and Egger claimed a priority date of April
16, 1958, which was later than Gisiger-Stahli's priority date of February 28,
1958, and were therefore barred from patenting claims 59 through 66.148
The holding in Zemla and the Fishman article were strongly attacked in a
1965 article by Harold S. Meyer. 49 Meyer started by noting that the language of
35 U.S.C. § 119 only referred to an application for patent.)' An application is
not a patent, and 35 U.S.C. § 119 is silent about patents.' 51 United States patents
are available as prior art references under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (e) on their
139 142 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 499 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1964).
140 d. at 499.
141 Id. at 500.
142 Id at 500.
143Id Gisiger-Stahli claimed priority to two earlier priority dates, July 2,1957, and February 28, 1958. Id. The
Board apparently concluded that only the February 28, 1958, priority document contained material that





148 Id. at 501.
149 Meyer, supra note 34.
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United States filing dates, and "[tihere has never been a clear authoritative ruling
that any earlier date is proper." 15 2
Meyer began his analysis by noting that the problem seemed to stem from a
confusion "between the effect of an application for patent as a constructive
reduction to practice (for claimed subject matter only), and as evidence of prior
knowledge (for unclaimed subject matter). It is not proper to apply the
procedural section of the statute 35 USC [§] 119 to the latter when it was
intended to apply only to the former." '153 Meyer then reviewed the previous law
and addressed whether the drafters intended a change by enactment of the
recodification of 1952.154
First, Meyer noted that the patent act of 1870 inserted the words "in this
country" into R.S. 488615 and that this language had remained unchanged until
1952.156 Second, R.S. 4923157 allowed a patent to be granted despite the
invention being known or used in a foreign country. 158 Third, the United States
entered into the International Convention treaty in 1887.159 In 1903, Congress
added a paragraph to R.S. 4887 to give a United States patent application "'the
same force and effect as ... if filed in this country on the date... first filed in' a
foreign country if the interval is not over twelve months, subject to
reciprocity." 160
In 1952, recodification placed the provisions of R.S. 4886 and 4923 in 35
U.S.C. § 102(a).16' The provisions of R.S. 4887 were rearranged into 35 U.S.C.
§ 119.162 The only new provision was 35 U.S.C. § 102(e). 163 Meyers then noted
that the House and Senate reports on the recodification bill of 1952 stated that 35
U.S.C. § 102(a), (b), and (c) were intended only to enact existing law concerning





154 Id. at 392-95.
155 Similar provisions are now in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). Id. at 393.
156 Id. at 393.







164 Id at 393-94.
165 Id at 394.
[Vol. 26: 2
14
Akron Law Review, Vol. 26 [1993], Iss. 2, Art. 11
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol26/iss2/11
HILMER DocTRiNE
The Milburn decision was based on the premise that a United States patent
application in Patent Office prosecution was evidence that the invention was
"known... by others in this country" which provided a defense to infringement
because the patentee " was not the original and first inventor." 166 This is the
underlying premise that permits United States patents to be cited as prior art as of
the United States filing date. 167
In determining whether this date could be pushed back to a foreign filing
priority date, Meyer looked to the language of Article 4 of the International
Convention. 168 Meyer argued that 35 U.S.C. § 119 was only intended to place
the United States in compliance with the Convention so United States inventors
could receive reciprocal rights in foreign countries. 169 "The treaty itself says two
things. First, the foreign filing establishes a right of priority. Second, certain
occurrences during the priority period shall not invalidate a patent applied for
during that period. That is all." 170
Meyer then discussed the concept of constructive reduction to practice and
concluded it applied only to subject matter that an applicant claimed or intended
to claim. 171 Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 119 and 104, a foreign filing is recognized only
as a constructive reduction to practice of the claimed subject matter in the foreign
country on the foreign filing date. 72 Unclaimed disclosure is merely evidence of
knowledge in a foreign country. 173 A foreign priority filing date is intended only
to protect a foreign inventor's right to a patent. 174
Meyer then presented and discussed several hypothetical situations using this
statutory construction. 75 These examples demonstrated "a clear purpose and
effect running through the patent law, favoring American inventors and
166 Id at 395.
1671d
168 Id. at 396. Article 4(a). "Any person who shall have duly filed an application for a patent... in one of the
contracting countries ... shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing application in other countries, and subject to the
rights of third parties, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter specified.
(b) Consequently, the subsequent filing in one of the other countries of the Union, prior to the expiration of
such periods, shall not be invalidated by acts performed in the interval, especially, by another application, by
publication of the invention or the working of the same...
(c) The periods of priority above referred to shall be twelve months for patents. . ." Id
169 Id. at 396-97.
170Id at 396.
171 Id. at 398.
172Id at 399.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 399-400.
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discriminating against foreign inventors."' 7 6 Meyers concluded that Congress
intended to favor American inventors.177
Meyer disagreed with the Zemla holding and criticized the combination of 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) with § 119.178 "It is apparent that some people think it to be
improper for a patent to be granted if there is any indication that the patentee is
not the first inventor in an absolute sense, but the law does not justify this."' 79
He concluded that the purpose of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 104, and 119 was to favor
United States inventors and granted a foreign inventor only a personal right to
defend against intervening patent defeating events.' 80 Only Congress had
authority to change this policy. 181
Hilmer I: The CCPA Confronts the Dispute
The argument came to a head in the 1966 decision of In re Hilmer.'8 2 Judge
Rich of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) squarely confronted
the issue and concluded that Commissioner Coe's Viviani decision was correct'83
and that 35 U.S.C. § 119 granted a foreign inventor only a personal right against
intervening patent defeating events. 8 4 35 U.S.C. § 119 does not establish a
United States patent as a prior art reference on an earlier foreign priority date. 85
A United States patent can be used as a prior art reference only as defined by the
"in this country" limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) or the "filed in the United
States" limitation of 35 U.S.C. § 102(e).186
In re Hilmer concerned an examiner's rejection of Hilmer's claims 10, 16 and
17.187 Hilmer and Habicht were involved in an interference which Habicht won
when Hilmer conceded priority of the invention defined by the count. '88 Hilmer
claimed a German priority filing date of July 31, 1957, and Habicht claimed a
Swiss priority filing date of January 24, 1957.189 Hilmer filed in the United
1761 4 at 401.
177 Id at 402.
1781 d at 408.
1791 d
180 id at 409.
181 It. at 410.
182 359 F.2d 859 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
1 8 3 Id at 882-83.
1 84 1d at 878.
185 id
186 id4 at 883.
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States on July 25, 1958, and Habicht filed in the United States on January 23,
1958. 90 These dates are presented in chronological order as follows:
January 24, 1957 Habicht filed in Switzerland.
July 31, 1957 Hilmer filed in Germany.
January 23, 1958 Habicht filed in the United States.
July 25, 1958 Hilmer filed in the United States.
After the interference, Hilmer's application was subjected to further ex parte
prosecution. 9' Claims 10, 16 and 17 were then rejected on Habicht as a primary
reference in view of a patent granted to Wagner et al. as a secondary reference.'9-
The references rendered Hilmer's rejected claims "obvious to one of ordinary
skill in the art.' 193
Hilmer appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and asserted that the
examiner had used the disclosure of the winning party of the interference as a
prior art reference and that this was not permitted by the patent statutes.' 94
Hilmer argued that Habicht's application became a prior art reference on
Habicht's United States filing date only; the examiner had incorrectly used
Habicht's earlier foreign filing date.195 Hilmer also argued that his concession of
priority related only to the count of the interference and had no bearing on
unrelated disclosure. 96
Several issues were argued to the Board. 97 Judge Rich reviewed these issues
and decided that they boiled down to the holding by the Board as follows:
The examiner insists, however, that the effective date of the Habicht
patent is January 24, 1957, the date of an application filed in
Switzerland which is claimed by Habicht under 35 U.S.C. [§] 119.
Appellants have not overcome this earlier date of Habicht. The issue
is hence presented of whether the foreign priority date of a United
States patent can be used as the effective filing date of the patent when
it is used as a reference. 19
1 9 0 1 d "
1911ld
192 ld. at 861-62.




197 Id. at 862-64.
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This is the issue that Judge Rich reviewed and analyzed in his opinion.199 Judge
Rich agreed that Hilmer could not claim the subject matter that Habicht now
claimed because he did not have support in his application.2°° Therefore, no
estoppel or res judicata arose out of the interference. 20 1
Judge Rich began his analysis with the following statement:
The issue in this case involves a question of statutory
interpretation basic to the operation of the patent system. This issue
has arisen because after decades of a uniform practice, and
interpretation of law which has existed in part since 1903 and in whole
since 1926, the Patent Office has made an abrupt about-face; having
refused for at least 30 years, after expressly ruling on the question, to
apply U.S. patents as references as of foreign "priority" dates, it has
changed its practice as made manifest in an unknown number of board
decisions. One of them is here on appeal. Another, as will presently
appear, has been reviewed under 35 U.S.C. [§1 145 in the District
Court for the District of Columbia where the Patent Office was
affirmed, [Eli Lilly v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (1965).] A third has
been published, Ex parte Zemla, 142 USPQ 499.2 2-
He then continued with his analysis by reviewing the Chasan and Rabin article,
and the Fishman and Meyer articles as well as several other articles that
discussed the subject.20 3
Judge Rich gave great weight to the Meyer article because Meyer had been
involved in writing the 1952 patent act.2 4 He also briefly discussed the Eli Lilly
decision in which a district court had upheld the new Patent Office procedure of
treating a United States patent as a prior art reference under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as of
the foreign priority filing date.205 Judge Rich adopted the position expressed by
Meyer and several other commentators and disagreed with the Eli Lilly court and
the Patent office.20 6 He appeared to be somewhat in dismay about the sudden
change in statutory interpretation: "[tihis change in long and continuous
administrative practice has also been made without any advance notice, hearing,
or stated basis in policy, economics, or international relations." 20 7
199 ld
200 Id at 862.
201 ld
202 Id at 864-65.
203 Id. at 865-67.
204 d at 866-67.
205 Id at 867.
206 lI. at 867-68.
207 Id at 868.
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Judge Rich began his opinion by noting that in In re Walker,208 the CCPA
had previously decided this issue.2° 9 He analyzed this decision as well as Er
parte Blumlein210 , an earlier Board of Patent Appeals decision.2" Allen Blumlein
was the famous British inventor of the television set and Doreen Walker was his
executrix.212 Judge Rich's analysis revealed that the CCPA had previously ruled
on exactly the same issue and that the Lilly court had misinterpreted the Walker
decision.2 13 "We therefore have in this Walker-Blumlein case decision by both
the board and this court that as to non-interfering subject matter the foreign
priority date of a U.S. reference patent is of 'no consequence' and that only the
United States filing date has to be overcome." 214
The opinion continued by addressing the propriety of reading 35 U.S.C. §
102(e) in combination with § 119.215 Judge Rich agreed that this interpretation
sounded seductively plausible based only on the language of the statutes. 216 He
concluded, however, that the logical flaw in this approach was in the assumption
that the two sections had to be read together. 217
A historical analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 119 followed.218 Based on legislative
records and reasoning similar to the Meyer article, Judge Rich came to the
following conclusion:
For the foregoing reasons, we are clearly of the opinion that
section 119 is not to be read as anything more than it was originally
intended to be by its drafters, the Commission appointed under the
1898 Act of Congress, namely a revision of our statutes to provide for
a right of priority in conformity with the International Convention, for
the benefit of United States citizens, by creating the necessary
reciprocity with foreign members of the then Paris Union.219
Concerning 35 U.S.C. 102(e), Judge Rich started by noting that section
102(e) is a patent defeating provision, "by contrast with section 119 which gives
208 213 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A. 1954).
209 359 F.2d at 868.
210 103 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 223 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1952 & 1953), affd, In re Walker, 213 F.2d 332 (C.C.P.A.
1954).
211 Id at 868-770. Citing Exparte Blumlein.
212 Id. at 868. In re Walker was the CCPA appeal of the board's decision in Exparte Blumlein. Id
213 Id at 869-70.
214 Id. at 869. However, Judge Rich noted the Walker court ultimately held that Blumlein could not patent the
claims because they were not patentably distinct from the claims Blumlein lost in the interference. Id.
215 Id at 870-71.
216Id at 871.
217 Iad at 872.
218 Id at 872-76.
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affirmative 'priority' rights to applicants . . . The priority right is to save the
applicant (or his application if one prefers to say it that way) from patent
defeating provisions such as 102(e); and of course it has the same effect in
guarding the validity of the patent when issued." 220 He then showed how 102(a)
and 102(e) were very closely related, were both restricted to activity in this
country, and how 102(e) had evolved from the Milburn decision which was
concerned only with activity in this country.22 1 The Milburn rule was most often
criticized because it sanctioned the use of "secret prior art" to invalidate a patent
because patent applications are kept secret during prosecution in the Patent
Office. 222 Judge Rich saw no reason to push the effective date further back in
time, thus generating even more "secret prior art" against United States
inventors. 223
Finally, Judge Rich felt that 35 U.S.C. § 104, in combination with the "in this
country" restrictions of 102(a) and (g) and the restriction to applications filed "in
the United States" of 102(e), clearly indicated a policy that knowledge and acts in
foreign countries should not defeat a United States application.224 The only
exception would be a priority dispute, in which case a foreign inventor could
establish priority only as specified by sections 104 and 119.225
Judge Rich concluded his opinion by reviewing several cases cited by recent
commentators on the subject to support the proposition that 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and
119 should be read together.226  He dismissed these cases as being either
incorrectly interpreted and irrelevant or, at best, only weak authority. 227
The Board's rejection of Hilmer's claim 17 was reversed because it was based
solely on 35 U.S.C. § 103 using Habicht as a prior art reference under §
102(e).229 There was, however, an additional ground for rejection of claims 10
and 16 which the Board had not addressed and which, therefore, was not
addressed in this opinion.229 The additional ground was a rejection because
claims 10 and 16 were unpatentable over the count of the interference (which
220Id.
221 Id. at 876-77.
222 Id. at 877.
223 Id
224 Id. at 878.
225 Id.
226 d. at 879-82. Ellis-Foster Co. v. Reichold Chemicals, Inc., 198 F.2d 42, 94 (3d Cir. 1952); Van der Horst
Corp. v. Chromium Corp., 197 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1952); Celanese Corp. of America v. Ribbon Narrow Fabrics
Co., 117 F.2d 481 (2d. Cir. 1941); Federal Yeast Corp. v. Fleischman Co., 13 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1926); Sperry
Rand Corp v. Knapp-Monarch Co. 193 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Pa. 1961), affd in part and rev'd in part, 307 F.2d
344 (3d Cir. 1962); Young v. General Electric Co., 96 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. 111. 1951).
227 359 F.2d at 879-83.
228 Id. at 884.
229 Id. at 884.
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Hilmer lost) in view of the Wagner et al. patent. 230 The case was remanded for
further consideration of this rejection by the Board of Patent Appeals. 23'
Following this decision, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the earlier Eli Lilly district court decision that Judge Rich had
criticized. 232
Ex parte Raspe
The Hilmer I decision settled the dispute over the relationship between 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) and (e) and 35 U.S.C. § 119. However, the relationship between
35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g) and 119 was not settled. In 1967, the Patent Office Board of
Appeals decided Ex parte Raspe233 which provided an insight into the Patent
Office's view of this relationship.
In Raspe, the examiner rejected claims 4 and 9 as fully anticipated by a
patent issued to Joly, and Raspe appealed the rejection.234 The Joly patent was
filed in the United States on May 3, 1961, and in France on May 14, 1960.235
Raspe's application was a division of an application filed in the United States on
May 2, 1961. The rejection was based on 35 U.S.C. 102(e). 236 By combining 35
U.S.C. § 102(e) with 35 U.S.C. § 119, the examiner held that the French filing
date was the effective date that established Joly's patent as a reference. 237 The
Board rejected this argument in light of the Hilmer I decision and the Court of
Appeals' Eli Lilly decision, and reversed the final rejection.238
Examiner in Chief Frederico wrote a concurrence that was more like a
dissent.239 He began by stating:
While I agree that Section 102(e) of the statute cannot now be used as
the basis for the availability of the Joly et al. disclosure as prior art, I
cannot agree to simply reversing the examiner without more but am of
the opinion that the facts in this case show sufficient basis for
rejecting the claims and that such a rejection should be made in order
to prevent the perpetration of a gross injustice. 24°
230-1d
231 Id.
232 Eli Lilly v. Brenner, 375 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
233 156 U.S.P.Q. 217 (BNA) (PaL. Off. Bd. App. 1967).
234 Id. at 217.
235 ld
236 Id







Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1993
AKRON LAW REvIEw [Vol. 26: 2
He went on to note that claim 7 of the Joly patent recited a method for making
the compound of appealed claim 4.241 The Claim 4 compound was conclusively
obvious over Joly's claim 7.242
Joly had complied with 35 U.S.C. §§ 104 and 119 and established a priority
date of May 14, 1960, which apparently was earlier than a German priority date
established by Raspe.2 43 Frederico thought that Joly's application should be
granted the status of an invention in this country under 35 U.S.C. 102(g), since
Joly had complied with the statutory requirements in establishing priority.244
Therefore, Joly's patent should have been available as a reference against Raspe's
application. 245 Frederico concluded by noting that Joly, by practicing his
patented process, would infringe Raspe's patented compound.246
This is an example of one of the unjust situations that can result from the
Hilmer I holding. Raspe was later in time than Joly every step of the way but
managed to receive a dominating claim because the Patent Office was compelled
to treat the Joly patent as if it didn't exist. Raspe, a German inventor, stepped
into the shoes of a United States inventor and received the benefit of a
congressional policy intended to benefit only United States inventors. 247
Hilmer II
The CCPA settled the relationship between 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g) and 119 in
1970.248 This decision followed the remand from Hilmer I and addressed the
board's decision on the remanded issue.249 The Board concluded that the subject
matter of Habicht's claim 1 was prior art against Hilmer.250 The Board was
241 ld at 218.




246 Id. at 218-19. "The allowance of claim 4 in this application would result in a most peculiar anomaly.
Appellants with a later date and unable or unwilling to overcome the prior legal date of the Joly et al. invention
would be given a dominating claim. If Joly et al. or their assignee, or licensees, practiced their patented process
in the United States or if they sold the product of their patented process in the United States, they would be
infringing claim 4; likewise anyone who purchased the compound from Joly et al. or their successors and sold
or used it in the United States would be infringing claim 4. The French inventors and their assignee would have
just cause for complaint if, after having claimed and established their date according to law, the Patent Office
then presented someone else having a later date with a claim which would prevent them from exercising their
own patented method or utilizing the fruits thereof." Id
247 As pointed out in The Hilmer Doctrine, Effective Date of Foreign Patent, Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) No. 292, at C-4 (Aug.26, 1976), Congressional policy favoring United States inventors is absent when
both applicants are foreign.
248 424 F.2d 1108 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
249 Id at 1110.250 Id
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divided on the basis for this holding.25' Two of the members stated that the basis
for their holding was "35 U.S.C. § 102(g) combined with § 119 and read in light
of § 104."252 The third member merely stated that Hilmer's concession of priority
was sufficient. 253 Judge Rich addressed only the majority holding. 254
Judge Rich began his analysis by noting that the subject matter of claims 10
and 16 were held obvious over subject matter of Habicht's claim 1 in view of
Wagner.255 Hilmer agreed that he could not patent claims 10 and 16 if they were
the same subject matter as Habicht's claim 1.256 "We note with care at the outset
that the board majority in no way relied on what occurred in the interference, on
the concession of priority, or on any estoppel growing out of the interference." 257
The Board decision was based on reading the "in this country" language of
35 U.S.C. § 102(g) in combination with the "in this country" language of 35
U.S.C. § 119.258 Judge Rich disagreed with this line of reasoning because it was
essentially the same as the Board's line of reasoning in Hilmer 1.259 He
reemphasized that 35 U.S.C. §§ 104 and 119 only allow a foreign inventor to
establish a priority date based on a filing in a foreign country and do not establish
that application or the claimed invention as prior art.260 In footnote 6 of the
decision, Judge Rich recognized the anomalous situation that Frederico discussed
in Raspe but stated that Congress had the responsibility to correct the problem.26'
Decisions Following Hilmer I and Hilmer II
Several decisions followed that further defined Hilmer doctrine. In Kawai v.
Metlesics, the CCPA finally gave effect to the "in this country" language of 35
U.S.C. § 119.262 The court held that a foreign application, as filed in the foreign
country on the priority date, had to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 in





255 Id at 1110-11.
256 d at 1111.
257 d
258 Id
259 Id at 1112.
260 Id at 1112-13.
261 Id at 1113-14 n.6. "We think it necessary to distinguish between the right to a patent, which is only a right
to exclude others, and a right to practice an invention or to be free of liability for infringement. Ifthe law as it
has been written by Congress created anomalous situations, then it is for Congress to decide whether to change
the law [emphasis added]. In the present case we do not see the anomalous situation that was seen in Raspe
since allowance of Claims 10 and 16 would not give appellants coverage of Habicht's claim 1 compound." Id.
262 480 F.2d 880 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The Hilmer I and Hilmer H holdings were essentially confined to
interpreting the "in this country" and "in the United States" language of 35 U.S.C. § 102.
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of four appeals from decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals. 264 The issue for
the resolution of each of these appeals was the same:
... whether an application for patent filed in a foreign country must
contain a disclosure of an invention adequate to satisfy the
requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. 112 if a later filed
United States application claiming that invention is to be accorded the
benefit of the filing date of the foreign application as allowed by 35
U.S.C. 119.11265
Three of the appeals involved patent applications by British inventors. 266 In
all three applications, the examiner rejected all the claims "as unpatentable under
35 U.S.C. 102(a) or 35 U.S.C. 103. ' 267 The cited references all had prior art
reference dates earlier than the United States filing dates of these applications. 268
In order to overcome these references, the inventors attempted to invoke 35
U.S.C. § 119 and obtain the benefit of their British filing dates which were
previous to the effective dates of the cited references. 269 The examiner refused
on the ground that the earlier British specifications failed to fulfill the
requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.270 Specifically, the
examiner found the disclosure of utility to be insufficient.271
The fourth appeal resulted from an interference between Kawai and
Metlesics. 272 Kawai was the junior party in the interference and moved to gain a
right of priority from an earlier application filed in Japan under 35 U.S.C. §
119.273 The primary examiner denied the motion on the ground that the Japanese
application did not fulfill the utility and how to use requirements of 35 U.S.C. §
112.274
Senior Judge Almond began the court's opinion by reviewing the history and
purposes of 35 U.S.C. § 119.275 The applicants argued that § 119 clearly stated
that the United States application should be treated as if it was filed in the United
States on the date the foreign application was filed.276 Therefore, only the United











275 Id at 883-84.
276 Id at 884.
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States application was required to meet the formalities of § 112. The Patent
Office argued that § 119 required that the foreign application should be treated as
filed in the United States on the foreign filing date.277 Therefore, the foreign
application must comply with the requirements of § 112.278
Senior Judge Almond admitted that § 119 arguably supported both
positions. 279 However, by analyzing the history and purposes of § 119, he
concluded that a foreign application must fulfill the § 112 requirements in order
to be accorded the benefits of § 119.280 The filing of a United States patent
application acts as a constructive reduction to practice if the application meets the
requirements of § 112.281 The effect of § 119 in combination with § 104 is to
grant a foreign applicant a constructive reduction to practice recognized by the
Patent Office and courts of this country. 282 Therefore, in order to receive the
benefit of a constructive reduction to practice, a foreign application must meet
the requirements of § 112.283 An applicant cannot gain "more rights than he
would have had if he had first filed in this country. In other words, the extent of
the right of priority is measured by the content of the foreign specification. The
applicant is entitled to the benefit of what it does disclose and no more."
284
The CCPA further refined the holding of Hilmer II in In re McKellin.285 The
issue on appeal was "whether claims may be rejected under 35 U.S.C. 103 on the
ground that a losing party to an interference is not entitled to claims which are
asserted to be obvious variations of the invention defined in the counts, when
section 102(g) and interference estoppel are not applicable."2 86 McKellin filed a
patent application in the United States on June 6, 1963.287 Maltha subsequently
filed a patent application on October 10, 1963.288 A division of this application
issued as a United States patent on November 5, 1968.289 The claims of the
Maltha patent and McKellin's application overlapped because an act that would
infringe the claims of Maltha would also infringe the claims of McKellin's
277 Id. at 884-85.
278 Id at 885.
279 Id.
280 ld at 885-86.
281 Id at 886.
282 Id. at 885-86.
283 lad at 886.
284 d at 889.
285 529 F.2d 1324 (C.C.P.A. 1976).
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application. 290 McKellin subsequently filed a continuation in part application
that copied the claims of the Maltha patent, thereby provoking an interference. 29'
An interference was declared, and Maltha succeeded in establishing a foreign
priority date of October 12, 1962, corresponding to his filing of an application in
the Netherlands. 292  McKellin moved to add additional counts, some
corresponding to species disclosed in Maltha's patent and others corresponding to
species not disclosed in Maltha's patent but within the scope of the existing
interference counts.293 However, the interference examiner refused these
motions.294 Ultimately, Maltha won the interference based on his foreign priority
date. ' 5
During subsequent ex parte prosecution, McKellin added claims for the
species that were refused entrance into the interference and to other species that
were not "within the scope of the interference counts." 296 All of the claims
differed "from the interference counts in one or more material respects."297 The
examiner rejected these claims as obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in view of the
Maltha patent or the counts of the interference. 298 McKellin argued that the
examiner's position was incorrect. 299 He noted that he had an earlier United
States filing date than Maltha, and that the counts were derived from Maltha's
application. 3°° Therefore, the counts were not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)
because of Hilmer II.30 1
The Patent Office Board of Appeals sustained the examiner's rejection.3°2
However, the Board did not fall into the trap of basing the rejection on a
combination of 35 U.S.C. §§ 102(g) and 119.303 Instead, the Board adopted the
reasoning of the third member of the Board in Hilmer H and merely stated that
McKellin was barred from patenting any claims that were obvious in view of the






295 Id at 1325-26.
296 Id at 1325.
297 ld
298 Id. at 1325-26.
299 Id at 1326.
300 Id.
301 Id at 1328.
302 Id at 1325-26.
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If we were to follow appellants' reasoning to its logical conclusion,
we would condone a situation in which, by presenting claims, drawn
sequentially, to compounds containing carbon chains from 1 to 20
carbon atoms, or to obvious variations of the compounds, the losing
party in an interference with a patent, (which relied on a foreign
priority date), could be granted a patent which would cover all aspects
of the invention defined in the counts of the interference as to which
he has been adjudicated not to be the first inventor. Obviously, this
would make a mockery of the interference practice. 3°5
On appeal, the Patent Office solicitor attempted a novel argument not raised
at the board level. 3°6 The court decided to consider the argument "because of its
guidance potential and because our view thereof cannot prejudice appellants. 30 7
The solicitor argued that lost counts of an interference are prior art to the losing
party since 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) mandated that a final award of priority in an
interference "shall constitute the final refusal by the Patent and Trademark Office
of the claims involved." 3°8 The court rejected this argument because 35 U.S.C. §
135(a) was intended only to finalize an interference dispute thereby saving time
in further ex parte prosecution.3°9 Being procedural in nature, 35 U.S.C. § 135(a)
could not be used as another source of statutory prior art.310
The court next considered whether there was a basis of rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 103.311 The court noted that subject matter of lost counts does not
become prior art merely from involvement in an interference. 31 2 In order to be
prior art, the subject matter of lost counts must come within 35 U.S.C. § 102.3 13
The court analyzed the evidence of record and concluded that Maltha had shown
only a constructive reduction to practice in a foreign country via a foreign filing
which was not statutory prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102.314 Under the reasoning
of Hilmer I and Hilmer II, 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e) and (g) were not applicable
and Maltha's patent was not prior art under any other section. 315
Finally, the court considered whether there was any judicial doctrine
whereby the subject matter of the lost counts became prior art.3 16 The court






312 lad at 1328.
313 id
314Id at 1328-29.
315 Id at 1329.
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reviewed several decisions offered by the Patent office solicitor and concluded
that all of these decisions involved situations where either priority was conceded,
or the subject matter of the lost counts was discovered to be already in the prior
art, or the subject matter of the lost counts had properly come in under some
provision of 35 U.S.C. § 102.3 17 Conceding priority is equivalent to admitting
that the invention was made by another in this country. 318 In a concurrence,
Judge Markey made some very pertinent observations concerning the "unjust"
results of this decision. 319
There are two further pertinent cases which provide a foreign inventor with at
least one way of establishing activity in this country. In Ex parte Hachiken, the
Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals held a foreign inventor could
prove conception of an invention in this country by evidence of a draft patent
application "introduced into this country by way of counsel." 320 In Clevenger v.
Kooi, the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Interferences held that
introduction of an invention disclosure into the United States could provide
evidence of conception in this country as long as the disclosure was enabling. 32'
In Clevenger, the disclosure originated at N. V. Philips
Gloeilampenfabrieken based in the Netherlands.322 According to standard
procedure, the disclosure was transferred to the U.S. Philips Corporation based in
New York and stored in files.323 The Board rejected Clevenger's argument that
mere presence of a disclosure in a file in the United States was insufficient to
constitute proof of conception in this country without some mental activity
contemplating the invention.324
317 Id. at 1329-30. Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Proctor Gamble Dist. Co., 1992 U.S. App. Lexis 19815 (C.A.F.C.
1992); In re Bass, 474 F.2d 1276 (C.C.P.A. 1973), superseded by statute; In re Fenn 315 F.2d 949 (C.C.P.A.
1963); In re Karplus, 97 F.2d 100 (C.C.P.A. 1938); In re Cole, 82 F.2d 405 (C.C.P.A. 1936); In re Williams, 62
F.2d 86 (C.C.P.A. 1932).
318 In re McKellin, 529 F.2d. at 1330.
319 Id. at 1333. "The desire of courts to avoid untoward results has often led to a desirable growth in the life of
the law. That desire can also lead to such confusion in the law as to render society almost rudderless in the area
involved. Though the law of patents seems occasionally a particular victim, the phenomenon occurs in all types
of cases. Whether it arises as an element of social jurisprudence or in an effort to effectuate a perceived public
policy, the dichotomy between the so-called activists, who would reach for the 'proper' result, and the so called
literalists, who would rigidly 'follow' the law as written, had probably existed since courts began. An almost
infinite shading exists between instances at opposite ends of the spectrum. In seeking a 'just' result, the written
law may in some cases be only slightly tilted, while in others it may be bent and twisted into unrecognizable and
grotesque forms. On the other hand, literal application of statutory law may produce results extending from
those only slightly spaced from equity to those so remote from our traditional concepts of justice as to cry out
for change in the written law. Similarly, we who are charged with the duty of deciding and of explaining our
decision may, from case to case, often and rightly find ourselves at various wavelengths in the activism-
literalism spectrumr. Happily, the constant activist, for whom the result controls, and total literalist, for whom
the result is irrelevant, are rare if not extinct." Id.
320 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 879, 880 (Pat. and Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1984).
321 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 189, 192 (Pat. and Trademark Off. Bd. Int. 1974).
322 Id. at 191.
323 19.324 Id at 192.
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THE HILMER DOCTRINE IN Ex PARTE PROSECUTION AFTER AN INTERFERENCE
In most countries, the first applicant for a patent establishes a right to patent
the invention against later applicants? 25  Under United States law, a second
applicant may be permitted to prove priority and a right to patent the invention
over the first applicant.32
6
An interference is a PTO proceeding to determine "any question of
patentability and priority of invention between two or more parties claiming the
same patentable invention.' '327  The examiner determines whether two
applications include interfering subject matter that is "patentable to each
applicant subject to a judgment in the interference. ' 328 The interfering subject
matter is defined by one or more counts.329 A count is defined by 37 C.F.R. §
1.601(f).330 Under 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) and 37 C.F.R. § 1.658(c), claims
corresponding to a count in an interference are forfeited by the losing party. 331
325 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 10.01 (1990).
326 Id. "The inventor who was the first to conceive the subject matter but the last to reduce to practice will
prevail if he exercised reasonable diligence in reducing to practice from a time just prior to when the first person
to reduce to practice conceived the subject matter." Id.
327 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1991). The "same patentable invention" is defined as follows: "Invention 'A' is the
'same patentable invention' as an invention 'B' when invention 'A' is the same as (35 U.S.C. § 102) or obvious
(35 U.S.C. § 103) in view of invention 'B' assuming invention 'B' is prior art with respect to invention 'A'.
Invention 'A' is a 'separate patentable invention' with respect to invention 'B' when invention 'A' is new (35
U.S.C. 102 and non-obvious (35 U.S.C. 103) in view of invention 'B' assuming invention 'B' is prior art with
respect to 'A'." 37 C.F.R. 1.601(n) (1991).
An interference can be declared between two pending applications, or a pending application and an
unexpired patent. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(i) (1991).
328 37 C.F.R. § 1.603 (1991).
329 ld
330 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(f) (1992). "A count defines the interfering subject matter between (1) two or more
applications or (2) one or more applications and one or more patents. When there is more than one count, each
count shall define a separate patentable invention. Any claim of an application or a patent which corresponds to
a count is a claim involved in the interference within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 135(a). A claim of a patent or
application which is identical to a count is said to 'correspond exactly' to the count. A claim of a patent or
application which is not identical to a count, but which defines the same patentable invention as the count, is
said to 'correspond substantially' to the count. When a count is broader in scope than all of the claims which
correspond to the count, the count is a 'phantom count' A phantom count is not patentable to any party." Id.
331 35 U.S.C. § 135(a) (1988). "Whenever an application is made for a patent which, in the opinion of the
Commissioner, would interfere with any pending application, or with any unexpired patent, an interference may
be declared and the Commissioner shall give notice of such declaration to the applicants, or applicant and
patentee, as the case may be. The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences shall determine questions of
priority of the inventions and may determine questions of patentability. Any final decision , if adverse to the
claims of an applicant, shall constitute the final refusal by the Patent and Trademark Office of the claims
involved, and the Commissioner may issue a patent to the applicant who is adjudged the prior inventor. A final
judgment adverse to a patentee from which no appeal or other review has been or can be taken or had shall
constitute cancellation of the claims involved in the patent, and notice of such cancellation shall be endorsed on
copies of the patent distributed after such cancellation by the Patent and Trademark Office." ld
37 C.F.R. § 1.658(c) (1992). "A judgment in an interference settles all issues which (1) were raised and decided
in the interference, (2) could have been properly raised and decided in the interference by a motion under §
1.633 (a) through (d) and (f) through (j) or § 1.634 and (3) could have been properly raised and decided in an
additional interference with a motion under § 1.633(e). A losing party who could have properly moved, but
failed to move, under §§ 1.633 or 1.634 shall be estopped to take ex parte or inter partes action in the Patent
and Trademark Office after the interference which is inconsistent with that party's failure to properly move,
29
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However, in limited situations, the losing party may patent claims that are
obvious variations over the lost counts of the interference in subsequent ex parte
prosecution. The purpose of this section is to show how a party who loses an
interference to a foreign inventor stands a much better chance of patenting
obvious variations of a lost count due to the CCPA's application of Hilmer
doctrine to § 102(g) in McKellin.
Interference estoppel represents one of the mechanisms through which a
losing party may be prevented from patenting claims that are obvious variations
over a lost count. 332 In the 1934 case of In re Chase, the CCPA set out the
principles of the doctrine:
The rule is well settled in patent law that as far as the Patent Office
and this court are concerned an interference settles not only the rights
of the parties under the issues or counts of the interference but also
settles every question of the rights to every claim which might have
been presented and determined in the interference proceedings. .. The
rule of estoppel is applied in such cases for the reason that it is
necessary to put an end to litigation in the Patent Office. 333
Chase involved two interferences. 3 4 The first was a seven-party interference
which included Chase and a rival applicant, Friden.335 The second was an
interference between Friden and Chase and involved claims from a second patent
application filed by Chase.336 The primary examiner recognized the common
subject matter between Chase and Friden and invited Friden to copy claims from
Chase's application to provoke an interference. 337 Friden complied and the
interference was initiated. 338 Friden then moved to dissolve the interference on
the ground that Chase was estopped from pursuing the claims in dispute because
Chase should have raised the issue in the first interference. 339 The Examiner of
Interferences granted the motion which left Friden in possession of Chase's
claims without a determination of priority.34° The board of appeals affirmed. 34l
except that a losing party shall not be estopped with respect to any claims which correspond, or properly could
have corresponded, to a count as to which that party was awarded a favorable judgment." Id.
332 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS (1989).
333 21 C.C.P.A. 1183, 1185 (1934).
334 Id. at 1184-85.
335 Id.
3 3 6 1d. at 1185.
337 Id. at 1185-86.
338 Id. at 1186.
339 Id at 1185-86.
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The CCPA noted that Chase might be estopped if the issues of the second
interference could have been properly raised in the first interference. 342
However, the parties conceded that Chase could not have properly raised the
issue in the first interference. 343 Had Chase raised the issue in the first
interference, the Examiner of Interferences would have declared a second
interference between Chase and Friden anyway. 344 Therefore, interference
estoppel did not apply and the rejection was reversed. 345
Another basis for rejecting claims that are obvious variations over a lost
count lies in 35 U.S.C. § 102(g).34 6 In 1957, the CCPA decided In re Gregg and
held that a losing party in an interference cannot subsequently patent claims that
are obvious variations over the disclosure of the winning party.347 The decision
of priority in the interference establishes the winning party's disclosure as prior
art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), and the losing party is prevented from claiming
obvious variations by 35 U.S.C. § 103.348 The court stated that it was applying
existing law which was not changed by the Patent Act of 1952. 349
In the 1965 case of In re Yale, the CCPA held that subject matter of an
interference count is prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) to a party who concedes
priority during an interference. 350 However, in order to support an obviousness
rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, the invention must have been obvious at the
time the invention was made.351 Yale was decided in the aftermath of two
interferences. 352 During the motion period of one of the interferences, Yale
unsuccessfully attempted to add additional subject matter to the count. 35 3 Yale
subsequently conceded priority.35 4 During later ex parte prosecution, Yale
attempted to add three claims that the examiner rejected over prior art references
having earlier effective dates than Yale's application. 355
On appeal, the board granted Yale "the benefit of earlier copending
applications which... adequately supported the subject matter of the claims."356
342 Id at 1186.
343 id.
344Id.
345 Id at 1186-87.
346 In re Gregg, 244 F.2d 316, 318 (C.C.P.A. 1957)
3 4 7 d.
348 Id.
349 ad at 318-19.
350 347 F.2d 995, 1000 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
351 Id.
352 Id. at 996-97.
353 Id at 997.
354 Id. at 998.
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However, the claims were ultimately rejected on a different ground.357 The board
rejected the three claims because they were obvious over the subject matter of the
lost count, which was prior art to Yale, in view of an additional patent granted to
Cusic as a secondary reference.358
The CCPA proceeded to address the issues.3 59 The court questioned whether
the subject matter of the lost counts could properly be applied as prior art to
Yale.36 ° The court applied essentially the reasoning expressed in Gregg.361 The
fact that Yale conceded priority made no difference. 362  Based on Yale's
concession, the subject matter of the lost count was prior art under 35 U.S.C. §
102.363
However, the court addressed a second issue as to whether the lost count
could be used as prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 103 under the facts of the case.364
Because Yale conceded priority, there was no evidence on record that established
the date on which Yale first conceived the subject matter of the three appealed
claims. 365 Under § 103, the invention must have been obvious at the time the
invention was made.366 Yale may have conceived the subject matter of the three
claims before Ullyot (the party who won the interference in which Yale conceded
priority) conceived the subject matter of the interference count.367 If so, then
Yale may have been entitled to the subject matter of the three claims which were
directed to compounds that were substantially different from the interference
count.368 Since the evidence was insufficient, the court reversed the rejection and
remanded the case for further proceedings. 369
In dicta, the court addressed interference estoppel. 370 The court noted that
interference estoppel is intended to decide all issues that could have been raised
during an interference.37' It can be applied when a party neglects or refuses to
contest priority of subject matter that is clearly common.372 However, it cannot
357 Id. at 998-99.
358 u
359 Id. at 999.
360Id.
361 d. at 999-1000.
362 Id at 1000.
363 Id.
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be applied to subject matter that is not clearly common and the board's intent is
not evident.373
In In re Kroekel, the CCPA held that interference estoppel prevents a party
who loses an interference from adding a generic claim in subsequent ex parte
prosecution that would dominate the interference count.374 Upon invitation by
the examiner, Kroekel provoked an interference by copying claims from an
application filed by Comstock.375 Kroekel did not attempt to broaden the count
in response to the notice of interference which included a warning the losing
party would be estopped from adding claims drawn to the subject matter of the
interference. 376 During the interference, Kroekel moved to narrow the phantom
count or in the alternative to dissolve the interference because neither party's
disclosure supported the count under 35 U.S.C. § 112.377 The primary examiner
granted Kroekel's motion dissolving the first interference and declared a second
interference based on the narrower count.378 Kroekel thought that Comstock
could not support a broader count and never moved to include the genus in the
interference. 379 Comstock subsequently won the interference.380
During subsequent ex parte prosecution, Kroekel added a claim that was
generic to the interference count.381 The generic claim was added by amending
the claim that had been the subject of the interference. 382 The examiner rejected
the generic claim and several others as being anticipated by the interference
count and a portion of Comstock's application.3 83 The board of appeals affirmed
the rejection on two grounds. 384 First, because a species disclosed in a reference
anticipates the genus under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g). 385 Second, Kroekel was estopped
since he did not attempt to broaden the count during the interference.3 86
The court was reluctant to address the § 102(g) rejection over a phantom
count387 . Instead, the court affirmed the rejection solely on the basis of
373 J1.
374 803 F.2d 705, 710-711 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
375 Id at 706.
376 Id. at 711.




381 Id. There was some discussion as to whether claim 40 was truly a genus claim. ld. The court treated claim
40 as a genus since the "parties have treated present claim 40 as 'generic' and 'dominating' with respect to the
lost count." Id.
382a
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interference estoppel. 388 Kroekel claimed that the interference decided only who
was entitled to claim the species as defined by the phantom count.3 89 He had no
duty to move to broaden the phantom count to include the genus because
Comstock did not have support in his specification to claim the genus. 39°
Therefore, he was still entitled to claim the genus and establish his date of
invention in spite of the interference. 391
The court began its analysis by noting that interference estoppel is intended
to end the litigation between the parties.392 Interference estoppel is based on
equity.393 The court held that Kroekel had an obligation to seek the broader
claim in the interference by moving to broaden the count.3 94 Interference
estoppel might not apply if he had attempted to broaden the count but was
refused by the PTO.395 The court held that whether Comstock could claim the
subject matter of the count was irrelevant. 396 By definition, a phantom count
includes subject matter that at least one party cannot claim.3 97 This did not
relieve Kroekel of the obligation to attempt to broaden the count if he wanted to
claim the genus.398
These decisions support the proposition that interference estoppel and
rejection over 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) subsequent to involvement in an interference
are separate and distinct theories. Chisum supports this view.399 Chisum also
argues that McKellin superseded a previous broader definition of the doctrine of
lost counts which established a lost count as prior art against the losing party. a°°
After McKellin, a lost count is prior art to the losing party only if it is prior art
under § 102(g). 401
388 Id.
389 Id at 709.
390Id
391 Id. Kroekel attempted to swear behind Comstock using a Rule 131 affidavit. Id. at 707. The court rejected
this argument since it would permit Kroekel to "circumvent the adverse priority determination in the
interference at the expense of the winning party." Id at 710.
392 Id
393 Id
394 Id at 710.
395 Id.
396 Id at 709.
397 Id.
398 Id.
399 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 5.03[31(h) (1989).
401 Charles L. Gholz concludes that In re Deckler, 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) and Ex parte Tytgat 225
U.S.P.Q. 907 (Pat. Off. Bd. App. 1985) prevent a party from patenting claims that are patentably indistinct from
an interference count of the basis of interference estoppel and that McKellin is a "curious historical anamoly."
Charles L. Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions iftge Federal Circuit in Patent Interferences, 75 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOCY. 448,475-76 (1993).d.
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Another source of discrimination against foreign inventors is now evident. A
domestic inventor who wins an interference can rely on either interference
estoppel or 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) to prevent the losing party from claiming subject
matter that is obvious over the interference count. The prior art restriction of 35
U.S.C. § 102(g) will nearly always apply to a domestic inventor because all
inventive acts will normally occur in this country. In contrast, all of a foreign
applicant's inventive acts normally occur in a foreign country, and a foreign
inventor will normally rely on 35 U.S.C. § 119 to establish priority. Therefore,
under McKellin, a foreign applicant will normally be deprived of protection
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) against a rival applicant's pursuit of claims that are
obvious over a lost count if the foreign applicant solely relies on 35 U.S.C. § 119
to establish priority. However, a foreign applicant should still be protected by
interference estoppel. 4°2
McKeIlin is an example of how a rival domestic applicant can patent claims
that are obvious over a lost count in spite of having lost the interference. As
demonstrated by Hilmer H, the situation can also occur when two foreign
inventors each rely on 35 U.S.C. § 119 to establish priority. The inventor that
files later in the United States can remove the earlier rival inventor's United
States application as prior art by claiming priority through 35 U.S.C. § 119. The
402 Irving Kayton and Daniel R. Cherry conclude that interference estoppel now has a broader interpretation
that permits a lost count to be cited against an applicant who loses an interference. 4 DANIEL R. CHERRY et al.,
PATENT PRACTICE, 17-23 (Irving Kayton & Karyl S. Kayton eds., 5th ed. 1992). They base their argument on
the fact that the Hilmer cases arose under old interference practice which was changed in 1984. Id. Under
current practice all of a party's claims that are not patentably distinct are supposed to grouped in a single count.
Id Current interference estoppel then prevents the losing party from patenting claims that are not patentably
distinct from the interference count.
However, as previously discussed in this comment, interference estoppel was not created in 1984 and the
McKellin court appears to have clearly made a distinction between a rejection based on interference estoppel
and a rejection based on 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) after an interference. Whether the Patent and Trademark Office has
the authority to expand the definition of interference estoppel to encompass rejections in all situations when the
opposing party's claimed invention is not prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) because of Hilmer 1I is outside the
scope of this comment.
The recent case of In re Deckler provides some insight into the CAFC's view of interference estoppel,
the Hilmer cases and McKellin. 977 F.2d 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1992) The issue in that case was "whether the Board
correctly ruled that the losing party in an interference proceeding was not entitled to a patent covering claims
that party admits are patentably indistinguishable from the claim involved in the interference." Id. at 1450.
Deckler lost an interference (under the old rules) and attempted to add a certain claims in subsequent ex parte
prosecution which the examiner rejected on the basis of interference estoppel. ld. at 1450-51. Deckler conceded
by default that the claims in dispute were not patentabty distinct from the interference count. ld The court held
that interference estoppel applied because Deckler's new claims were not patentably distinct and because his
interference opponent won priority. Id. at 1452. Deckler argued that the previous Hilmer 1, Hilmer 11, and
McKellin holdings dictated a different conclusion. Id at 1452-53. The court distinguished these cases as being
based on 35 U.S.C. § 103 rejections. Id. at 1453. In those cases, the interference count was used as prior art
against the losing party, which was not the case in Deckler. Id. "Unlike the situation in those three cases, here
the Board did not use the interference count as prior art in making an obviousness determination, but based its
decision on a wholly different theory. We decline to extend those decisions to the different issue in this case."
Id Obviously, the CAFC views interference estoppel and rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 subsequent to an
interference as distinct theories.
This raises an interesting question. The "same patentable invention" is defined by 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(n)
based on 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103. 37 C.F.R. § 1.601(n), supra note 314. Are Hilmer I, Hilmer II, and
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earlier inventor may not be able to prevent the later inventor from patenting
claims that are obvious variations of the earlier inventor's claims.
One way to mitigate the problem is for a foreign inventor to establish some
activity in the United States as soon as possible after filing the application in the
foreign country. Examples of such activity include sending a draft patent
application to U.S. counsel,403 and sending an enabling invention disclosure to a
parent company or subsidiary in the United States.4°4 Following this course of
action may allow a foreign applicant to establish his invention as prior art under
35 U.S.C. § 102. Relying solely on 35 U.S.C. § 119 is dangerous.
HILMER DOCTRINE AND THE PATENT SYSTEM HARMONIZATION ACT OF 1992
The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, if passed, would supersede 35 U.S.C.
§§ 102, 103 and 104, and enact 35 U.S.C. § 106.405 Proposed subsection (a)(1)
403 Exparte Hachiken, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 879 (Pat. and Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1984).
404 Clevenger v. Kooi, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 188 (Pat. and Trademark Off. Bd. App. 1974).
405 The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) and S. 2605, 102d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1992).
"Sec. 106. CONDITIONS FOR PATENTABILITY; first to file, novelty, nonobviousness, senior priority, and
right to patent
(a) IN GENERAL. An applicant shall be entitled to a patent unless
(1) the subject matter was disclosed in the prior art, which for the purposes of this section means that
such subject matter was publicly known or publicly used in the United States, or patented or described in a
publication in the United States or in a foreign country, before the filing date or priority date of the application
for patent,
(2) though the subject matter is not identically disclosed or described in the prior art, the differences
between the subject matter of the claim and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the application for patent for the invention was filed to a person having ordinary skill
in the art to which such subject matter pertains, except that patentability shall not be negated by the manner in
which the invention was made,
(3) the subject matter is described in an application for patent of another applicant that has been
previously filed in the United States and has been open to public inspection under section 122, or
(4) the subject matter
(A) was derived from an inventor not named in the application for patent, except that subject matter
representing an obvious variant developed by an inventor not named in the application shall not preclude
patentability under this subparagraph if such subject matter and the claimed subject matter were, at the time the
application for patent is filed, owned by the same person or subject to an obligation of assignment to the same
person, or
(B) was on sale in the United States more than one year before the filing date of the application for
patent.
(b) GRACE PERIOD. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a), subject matter disclosed in the prior
art not more than one year preceding the filing date or priority date of the application for patent shall not affect
novelty or nonobviousness under this section whenever it results from a disclosure of information obtained
directly or indirectly from an inventor named in the application." d
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defines prior art, subsection (a)(2) defines obviousness, subsection (a)(3)
establishes first-to-file provisions, and subsection (a)(4) maintains the existing
"on sale bar" and, in addition, prevents patentability in a derivation situation.4 6
In order to comply with the WIPO draft agreement, Hilmer doctrine must be
eliminated.407 Converting to a first to file system would eliminate 35 U.S.C. §
102(g), which would implicitly supersede the holding of Hilmer II.
The Hilmer I holding would be superseded if proposed § 106 is interpreted to
comply with the European Patent Convention (EPC) concepts of novelty and
inventive step. Under the EPC, a patent application is considered as prior art on
its priority filing date only for determining novelty.408 The EPC has a concept
similar to obviousness called "inventive step."4°9 When determining whether an
invention claimed in an application meets the inventive step test, everything
available to the public at the time the application is filed, including published
patent applications, is prior art.410 A patent application is not available as prior
art for determining inventive step before its publication date.411 These concepts
are compatible with Articles 11412 and 13413 of the WIPO draft agreement.
406 1&
407 Fiorito, supra note 5, at 30.
408 Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention) [hereinafter EPC], Oct. 5,
1973, art. 54, 13 I.L.M. 286.
"(1) An invention shall be considered to be new if it does not form part of the state of the art.
(2) The state of the art shall be held to comprise everything made available to the public by
means of a written or oral description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the
European patent application.
(3) Additionally, the content of European patent applications as filed, of which the dates of
filing are prior to the date referred to in paragraph 2 and which were published under Article 93
on or after that date, shall be considered as comprised in the state of the art..." Id.
409 d. "An invention shall be considered as involving an inventive step if, having regard to the state of the art,
it is not obvious to a person skilled in the art. If the state of the art also includes documents within the meaning
of Article 54, paragraph 3, these documents are not to be considered in deciding whether there has been an
inventive step." Id.4101d
"
411 Id. Previously filed patent applications defined by Article 54(3) are explicitly excluded in Article 56. Id.
412 Article 11, Entitled, Conditions of Patentability, provides:
1. The invention must be novel, that is it does not form part of the prior art which
consists of everything that has been made available to the public anywhere in the world;
provided, however that any Contracting Party can exclude from prior art oral disclosures, or
exhibitions outside the Contracting Parties territory; and provided further that the novelty of an
invention is not denied on the basis of a "mosaic" of various prior art elements.
2. The invention must involve an inventive step, that is having regard to the prior art, it
would not have been obvious to a person skilled in the art.
3. At the option of the Contracting Parties, the invention may be required to be useful or
industrially applicable.
Fiorito, supra note 5, at 30.
413 Article 13, Entitled, Prior Art Effect of Certain Applications on Novelty, provides:
1. The whole contents of an application including the description, drawings and claim,
but not the abstract, will be considered to be prior art against an invention claimed in an
application filed in the same country at a later time. The earlier application will be considered to
be prior art as of the priority date provided it is published subsequently by the Patent Office.
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Under this interpretation, "prior art" is defined under § 106(a)(1) as including
information publicly known or used in the United States and information
patented or described in a printed publication anywhere in the world before an
applicant's priority date.414 This definition is imported into the test for
obviousness defined in § 106(a)(2) by referring to "prior art."415 Under this
interpretation, information actually available to the public on an applicant's
priority date is prior art for determining obviousness, including published United
States patent applications. 416
The test for novelty comes in under § 106(a)(3), which prohibits an applicant
from receiving a patent if "the subject matter is described in an application for
patent of another applicant that has been previously filed in the United States."417
Combining 35 U.S.C. § 119 and § 106(a)(3) presumably gives a foreign priority
filing the same effect as if the application had been filed in the United States on
the foreign priority date. However, combining these two sections is very similar
to the line of reasoning Judge Rich rejected in Hilmer I. Since that decision was
heavily based on legislative policy and intent, a court may come to a different
conclusion if the intent of proposed § 106 is to conform to the WIPO draft
agreement. Amending proposed § 106 to specifically refer to § 119 would seem
wise in order to prevent any future dispute.
Under the preceding interpretation, proposed § 106 supersedes the Hilmer IH
holding since prior art under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) and (e) is referenced to the
inventor's date of invention, and prior art under proposed § 106 is referenced to
the priority filing date in the case of novelty, and to the publication date in the
case of obviousness. A United States patent application would not be available
as a general prior art reference on its United States filing date. Foreign and
domestic inventors would be treated the same.
Any Contracting Party may consider the earlier application to be prior art for purposes of
determining non-obviousness, in addition to novelty.
2. The former application will not be applied as prior art against an application by the
same inventor.
Fiorito, supra note 5, at 30.
414 Proposed § 106(a)(1) of The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
and S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
415 Proposed § 106(a)(2) of The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
and S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
416 Under proposed § 106, pertinent information includes patented inventions and publications anywhere in the
world, and information publicly known or used in the United States. The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992,
H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) and S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
417 Proposed § 106(a)(3) of The Patent Harmonization Act of 1992, H.R. 4978, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992)
and S. 2605, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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Patent harmonization is very important to the future technological integrity
and economic vitality of the United States. This paper has focused on an aspect
of patent harmonization of interest to foreign inventors. Under current United
States law, a United States patent issued to a foreign inventor can be used as prior
art under 35 U.S.C. 102(a), (e)418 or (g)4 19 as of the United States filing date, not
an earlier foreign filing priority date established under 35 U.S.C. § 119. The
right of priority under 35 U.S.C. § 119 grants a foreign inventor only a personal
right against events that might bar patentability intervening between the foreign
filing date and the United States filing date.4 20
This comment reveiwed various decisions that demonstrated the
disadvantages suffered by foreign inventors. These disadvantages are especially
severe in an interference context. A foreign inventor who wins an interference
may not be able to prevent the losing party from patenting obvious variations of
the invention. In many situations, this can effectively eliminate the value of a
foreign inventor's United States patent. In addition, courts have applied Hilmer
doctrine when two foreign inventors are involved. In such a case, the policy of
favoring domestic inventors has no application, but the second foreign inventor
that files a United States application gains the advantage intended for the
domestic inventor.
Hilmer doctrine is eliminated under proposed 35 U.S.C. § 106 of the Patent
Harmonization Act of 1992. Foreign inventors have a lot to gain if Congress
changes existing United States practice. In view of the amount to be gained,
foreign inventors should be willing to make comparable concessions in the patent
laws of their respective countries.
KEVIN L. LEFFEL
418 In re Hilmer, 359 F.2d 859, 883 (C.C.P.A. 1966).
419 in re l-imer, 424 F.2d 1108, 1112-13 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
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